Introduction
In his introductory essay, Brian Bercusson notes:
Actors at disparate levels ... are linking up to form novel regulatory approaches ... The efficacy of these emerging forms of labour regulation, their democratic legitimacy, the goals and values underlying them, and the direction of reform are all in dispute. 1 The ambition of this chapter is to explore one such "novel regulatory approach" -reflexive labour law -and to assess not only its efficacy, legitimacy and normative aspirations, but also its intellectual origins, assumptions and implications.
The growing corpus of reflexive labour law scholarship comprises foundational essays by Gunther Teubner, 2 an extensive body of work by Drs. Rolf Rogowski and Ton insistence on the autopoietic -self-referential, self-regulating and self-reproducingcharacter of law; and its novel hypothesis that law acts not so much by imposing itself on other social domains directly as by regulating their self-regulatory processes as well as its own.
5
I will explore some of these ideas in greater detail below. First, however, I will sketch out three case studies of self-regulation in the labour sphere which will hopefully bring into focus these features of reflexive law. Next, I will consider reflexive labour law from the perspective of legal theory and political economy, with particular emphasis on the marginalization of the state in both domains. And finally, I will explore the possibility that the normative implications of reflexive labour law may turn out to be even more important than its descriptive insights to conceal corporate exploitation; they fill a regulatory gap caused by the inability of states to regulate the actions of corporations outside their own boundaries; they signal an innovative shift in the modalities of market regulation from a pure state-based command model to new hybrid models involving a mix of public and private initiatives; they are a concession wrung from governments and corporations as a result of pressures generated by political and social actors concerned about exploitation and abuse; and -perhaps -they are evidence of the existence of autopoietic systems and of the ubiquity of reflexive law.
Three case studies

Case study no. 1 -Voluntary codes of conduct
The use of the term "voluntary" to describe these codes requires some explanation.
They are typically adopted without compulsion of law; thus in a juridical sense they are indeed voluntary. But in a practical sense, they are generally less so. They are often adopted only after a corporation has been accused of exploiting or abusing its workers, either at home or abroad. Adverse publicity ensues, and the corporation is confronted by threats of moral, economic or political sanctions such as consumer boycotts, sympathetic industrial action, denial of government loans and procurement contracts, or (infrequently) legislation barring its goods from market. If these threats are deemed credible, the corporation must respond. One response is to adopt a "code" which declares its commitment to respect fundamental labour rights such as freedom of association, a safe work environment and the absence of coercion and discrimination.
In a variant of this scenario, corporations which are not themselves the immediate target of censure or pressure, but are potentially vulnerable to it, may proactively adopt a code developed by a sectoral organization, an international agency, a national government, or their professional advisors. Or they may adopt a code entirely on their own initiative, in an effort to secure whatever market or moral rewards accrue to exemplars of corporate social responsibility. In a final variant, corporations may be drawn into collaboration with NGOs in drafting, administering and even monitoring a code. 7 To reiterate: in these scenarios, codes are "voluntary" in the sense that corporations do not adopt them under compulsion of state law. But of course they are also "non-voluntary", in the sense that they are adopted out of fear of sanctions or hope of reward. A recent survey of major Canadian companies doing business abroad discloses that over 85% professed to have a written document dealing with corporate ethics relating to labour, environmental and business practices, including about 50% which described such statements as "rules of conduct" or "guidelines". However, over 60% did not train their staff to administer such documents; virtually all those which did spent 4 hours per year or less on such training; that only 15-25% of such companies applied any aspect of their ethics codes to suppliers; only 2-12% reported to their Boards of Directors on compliance; and similarly low rates of Board oversight were exercised even with regard to the firms' own practices. Bribery stands apart as receiving somewhat more intensive and extensive scrutiny. KPMG, Ethics Survey 2000 -Managing for Ethical Practice http://www.kpmg.ca/english/services/docs/ fas/ ethicssurvey2000e.pdf. are guilty of egregious behaviour: only that codes per se do not seem to not seem to be an efficient or contributing cause of higher labour standards. being taken to ensure that suppliers and other elements in the production chain do not embarrass the company by violating code standards. Fifth, less frequently, the language of the code is re-written to provide more explicit guarantees of a broader range of employment standards, occasionally even including a "living wage" or a "fair wage". And finally, sanctions are built into some code regimes in the form of compliance marks or labels whose presence or absence will trigger positive or negative consumer reactions.
It is too early to assess what practical consequences -if any -might flow from these second generation corporate codes. However, a third generation may be just over the horizon. One distinguishing feature of third generation voluntary corporate codes would be that they cease to be purely "corporate"; states and civil society actors would be equal partners or even prime movers in their drafting, promulgation, administration and enforcement. 12 The other is that they would no longer be purely "voluntary"; they would be mandated and enforced by law. Legislation has been proposed in both the United chapter, they are unlikely to surface soon. Codes, therefore, remain no more than a potentially interesting example of how reflexivity and change may occur in a closed normative system.
Case study no. 2 -Ratcheting Labour Standards
An important recent academic article has proposed that leading corporations should commit themselves to "ratcheting labour standards" permanently upward. The essence of this "RLS" proposal is to create a system for ... monitoring and public disclosure of working conditions [which would] ... create official, social and financial incentives for firms to monitor and improve their own factories and those of their suppliers. This would be accomplished by creating ... an easily accessible pool of information with which the best practices of leading firms could be publicly identified, compared and diffused to others in comparable settings....The combination of firm-level monitoring and an infrastructure for pooling results would help to set provisional minimum standards of corporate behaviour, upon which competition -driven by social and regulatory pressures -would generate improvements that then "ratchet" standards upwards.
15
The key features of the RLS proposal -transparency, competition, continuous improvement and sanctions ("social and regulatory pressures") -mark it as worthy of attention from students of reflexive labour law. However, it has already received attention -unflattering attention -from labour and academic commentators, who have dubbed it "wishful thinking". 16 As one such commentator has noted, there is little empirical evidence that RLS will in fact produce the desired results:
...of 61 factories "certified" by SA8000 [a standard such as those proposed by the authors of RLS], 34 of them are in China. In the SA8000 code there is very strong language about freedom of association. If any workers in those 34 factories were to try and exercise the rights spelled out in the code, they would find themselves in jail or an insane asylum. A less polemical, recent empirical study of codes operating in four Chinese footwear factories which supply footwear to US-based transnational corporations concluded: "the absence of de facto supporting institutions and norms at the national and local level in China militated against workers' awareness and support for workers' rights, as enshrined in labour legislation and the codes of practice. For the codes to be effective ... institutional supports in the form of labour law enforcement, some kind of legitimate, independent workers' institution, and procedures for skill enhancement, will be necessary...." S. Frenkel, "Globalization, Athletic Footwear Commodity Chains and Employment Relations in Southern China" (2001) 22 Organizational Studies 531 at 558. its regulatory reach and wisdom", that it is not "a concession to unfettered markets" but rather that it will "strengthen the hands and extend the horizons of those who have long championed workplace improvements". 19 However, state action is clearly not an intrinsic feature of RLS. On the one hand, RLS rests on the fundamental assumption that conventional regulation by the state has proved incapable of achieving its objectives, and that it must be replaced or supplemented by new regulatory strategies which are more compatible with the political economy of globalization. For that reason, the design of RLS begins not with state initiatives or in state institutions but with private initiatives and in the corporate context. On the other hand, RLS proponents do make passing reference to "a more ambitious" model of their project. In this more ambitious model, they suggest, states might enact legislation requiring domestic firms to participate in RLS, might promulgate performance standards and benchmarks generated by RLS procedures as their own official labour standards, might "transform their own regulatory systems from fixed-rule to ratcheting by requiring domestic firms to score high on RLS measures or face sanctions," and might (one can infer) impose sanctions which are of a "regulatory" as well as a "social" character.
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In short, even in the eyes of its proponents, for RLS to become "more ambitious", it must become more state-centred. Finally, the Compact initiates various processes -a learning forum, policy dialogues, company and partnership initiatives and outreach -through which it seeks to promote the dissemination of best practices, to encourage their adoption by subscribing corporations, and to foster cooperation amongst corporations, governments, unions and civil society.
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On its face, the UN Global Compact seems at worst innocuous, and at best a modest step towards promoting global corporate accountability. Indeed, it is likely the most amibitious initiative that the Secretary General could hope to undertake, given the adamant refusal of many states to accept any measures which might compromise their 22
Freedom of association and effective recognition of the right to collective bargaining (principle 3); elimination of forced and compulsory labour (principle 4); effective abolition of child labour (principle 5); and elimination of discrimination in respect of employment and occupation (principle 6). This includes work on jural polycentricity or legal pluralism; Bourdieu's emphasis on the constitution of the "legal field", studies by Burawoy and Stuart Henry on workplace normativity; the governance school which derives from the work of Foucauld; analyses of the emergence of "soft law", especially in transnational relationships; and elements of critical legal studies. For references to this work see H. Arthurs, "Landscape and Memory": Labour Law, Legal Pluralism and Globalization in T. Wilthagen (ed.) Advancing Theory supra note 3.
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See generally David Nelken, "Changing Paradigms in the Sociology of Law" in G. Teubner (ed.) ways, then, they share an attitude of scepticism about the state's central role in the meta-narrative of law.
And now a second observation. The de-centering of the state is not only an important issue for socio-legal scholars. It is the defining issue of political life in most countries.
The notion that the state should intervene actively to promote the public interest and distribute public goods has been the subject of relentless, often irrational and sometimes cogent criticism for almost as long as activist government has been advocated and practised. However, especially since the Thatcher and Reagan administrations of the 1980s, this criticism has become particularly strident in the English-speaking world. It has produced disenchantment with the state, and apathyeven hostility -towards electoral politics not least, ironically, amongst marginalized groups which are the principal clients of state intervention and amongst the political and technocratic elites which have been shaping state policy and directing state administration.
Disenchantment, hostility and apathy have transformed the discourse of labour law. It is no longer a given that the state can or should ensure minimum labour standards, promote countervailing power, redistribute wealth or coordinate corporatist strategies which feature labour as a prominent contributor and principal beneficiary. Instead, the state is now to be assigned the more mundane tasks of providing infrastructure, Autopoietic Law -A New Approach to Law and Society (Berlin/NY: de Gruyter, 1988). supporting human resource development, blaming refugees and immigrants for labour market dislocations caused by structural adjustment to technology and globalization, and imposing economic and legal discipline on assertive workers. Likewise, the key participants in the formation of labour policy have changed. Labour lawyers (now "employment lawyers"), industrial relations managers (now "human resources" officers), trade unionists (still "trade unionists", but fewer in number) and labour ministries (where they still exist) no longer play key roles, if any; economists, corporate lobbyists, central bankers, Treasury officials and Ministries of Trade and Industry now control the agenda. 31 And that agenda itself has changed, both for policy makers and scholars. individual employment law -for practical reasons, the law of privileged categories of workers -attracts more attention than collective labour law.
In short, the de-centering of the state has altered power relations. Most states are now unwilling or unable to confront powerful global corporations, which can dis-invest with relative ease, which can relocate production to more business-friendly jurisdictions, and which can destabilize share prices and national currencies. In fact, in most states, the shift of political power away from labour is accepted, however glumly, as a fact of life.
Governments confront only sporadic protests against the loss of labour's entitlements, only plaintive pleas for protection against the dislocations which result from the "creative destruction" of global capitalism. Even the traumatic anti-globalization protests in Seattle, Prague, Genoa, Quebec and elsewhere have not so far produced organized, sustained, mass support for laws and policies which protect workers. For all of these reasons, workers -even those who populate the thinning ranks of unions -are reluctant to challenge their employers. This, I suggest, is the context within which we must understand the recent proliferation of experiments in corporate self-regulation.
The political economy of a reflexive labour law system: voluntary codes as a test case
Against this background, one may ask: if socio-legal theory and political economy are of reflexivity in labour law whether in its conflictual or non-conflictual aspects. Nor does he have much to say specifically about corporate codes or other forms of corporate selfregulation. Nonetheless, the three case studies summarized above -of corporate codes, of RLS and of the UN Global Compact -generally do support Rogowski's "research hypotheses". However, in each case one must enter a serious caveat.
It is true that voluntary code-based systems are totally or largely "autonomous", that they are closed systems and that tribunals associated with them -though rare -are indeed highly specialized. But there is little evidence that code-based systems actually produce innovation, except to the extent that by masking or cosmeticizing the decline of state labour law they help to facilitate and normalize the shift of power from unions and workers to employers.
As Rogowski predicts, these new regimes of corporate self-regulation -unlike state law -are often neither rational nor instrumental nor formal in their operation and effects.
Their mandates tend to be expressed only in vague and modest aspirational terms; their capacity to initiate action or pursue complaints is circumscribed; their remedial powers are negligible or non-existent; their professional character is typically underdeveloped; their activity levels are low; and their capacity or ambition to actually shape the conduct of the corporations which promulgate them appear to be minimal. Consequently, as near as anyone can tell, they have produced little change in the workplace. In fairness, while claims and counter-claims abound concerning the efficacy or inefficacy of self-To compensate, as Rogowski points out, these regimes are often heavily "proceduralized", in the sense that they seek to achieve their objectives by emphasizing transparency, the promotion of cooperation and the dissemination of best practices.
Their proceduralism is fraught with great symbolic significance. Performances of the rituals of self-regulation -the well-publicized adoption of a code, for example, or the blessing conferred on the exercise by senior government officials, the undertaking of annual compliance audits, the occasional solemn exorcism of an offending contractor, the publication of self-congratulatory reports -tell us a great deal about the values and interests which shape labour market regulation today. 38 They remind us that states and their voters seem content that corporations should create and administer their own standards, that they should be trusted and admired for their conscientious behaviour, and that while workers should benefit from such behaviour, they should play no role in shaping or censuring it. And they remind us, as well, that to the extent that reflexivity is accomplished by such symbolic strategies, we must ask ourselves what are its prospects for improving on the outcomes achieved by more conventional regulatory regimes.
regulatory regimes, the literature does not provide much empirical evidence one way or the other. The most sophisticated empirical study to date, however, concludes that companies which have subscribed to an code of self-regulation in the US Chemical Industry have a worse environmental record than those which did not. See A. King and M. Lenox, supra note 10. Rogowski hypothesizes that workplaces are increasingly regulated by multiple regimesincluding "company procedures and other mechanisms of self-regulation" -which contribute to legal complexity, and ultimately to the "juridification of social regulations".
39
Because these multiple regimes interact with but do not control each other, he suggests, state courts tend to concentrate on the necessary task of resolving conflicts amongst them rather than regulating employers and workers directly. A reasonable hypothesis: but what does it imply?
On the one hand, courts may use state laws of general application or broad concepts such as "jurisdiction" to mediate inter-systemic conflicts by limiting the autonomy of one system or enlarging that of another. In given circumstances, this may protect workers' rights and limit corporate power. Or courts may use concepts such as "due process" or "reasonableness" to ensure that all systems -state or private -conform to minimal standards of fairness. Again, in given circumstances, workers may be the beneficiaries.
However, even such well-meant curial mediation may undermine or over-burden the fragile procedures, doctrines and discourses of reflexive workplace systems and render them incapable of performing the protective functions for which they were originally designed. 40 On the other hand, when courts decide to simply take a hands-off attitude to reflexive regimes, the result can also be prejudicial to workers. 41 Everything depends on the nature of the systems in question.
Likewise, courts may decide to attempt to resolve inter-systemic conflicts not by adjusting reflexive workplace regimes to conform to the mediating principles of state An American federal district court has been asked to issue a consent decree approving the settlement of litigation by some 50,000 Asian migrant workers against a group of garment manufacturers in the Marianas, an offshore U.S. dependency. The proposed decree would mandate the adoption of a code of conduct to prevent continuation of egregious employment practices by the employers, require that the code contain effective monitoring, complaint and remedial procedures, and place the whole arrangement under the ongoing surveillance of specially-trained court monitors. For a history of the litigation, see Sweatshop Watch, Summary of the Saipan Sweatshop Litigation, http://igc.org/swatch/marianas/summary10_00.html.
It seems clear, then, that Rogowski is right in his fundamental insight that the existence of normative pluralism raises issues of legal complexity and internormativity which in turn invite mediation by state courts. But it is now important to add that there is no single set of appropriate organizing principles which must inform such mediation, that there is no way of predicting whether mediation will work in favour of particularistic, indigenous or reflexive law rather than in favour of state laws of general application, and that there is no necessary assurance that the resulting social outcomes are likely to be favour workers rather than employers. From Rogowski's perspective, systemic mediation is driven by a tendency towards the reduction of legal complexity. However, as he acknowledges, the reduction of legal complexity may amount in practice to deregulation of the labour market. This is clearly a matter of concern to Rogowski who distinguishes "reflexive deregulation" of the workplace from that driven by neo-liberal ideology. Indeed, Rogowski's own preference is for an approach which " ... pursues not only economic but also wider social goals, ...
[which] tries to strike a balance between employer demands of reduced levels of protection and the employees' interests to find and keep a secure job". 44 At the least, it seems that the postmodern view of the state and the reflexive analysis of law may become self-fulfilling prophecies. Theories such as reflexivity are not parthenogenic: they do not create themselves, write themselves, disseminate themselves. They are produced by human intelligence and propagated by human agents -by scholars like us. But scholars like us are also -inescapably -political actors: we write books and articles and shape the thinking of students, lawyers and judges; we advocate public policies and advise governments and civil society organizations; we prepare legal opinions and draft legislation. My concern is that our scientific work will -even against our intentions -come to affect our political work, so that our descriptive hypotheses about how law works will become prescriptive. After all, if we believe in autopoiesis, what can we say about legislation or right-based litigation or other purely instrumental approaches to law? If we believe in legal reflexivity, how can we be critical, much less cynical, about corporate self-regulation which, after all, is a text-book example of the phenomenon? At some point, then, what we believe as scholars is likely to impinge upon what we do as political actors. When it does, the activist state is going to suffer the defection of some of its most influential and knowledgeable supporters -a loss it can ill afford in this era of neo-liberal ascendancy.
Finally, in this scenario, it is not just the state and its legal system which are being transformed by the simultaneously assault of neo-liberalism and post-modern theorizing. The metaphoric death of the state is likely to have the same disconcerting 48 H. Arthurs, "'Landscape and Memory': Labour Law, Legal Pluralism and Globalization" in effects on labour lawyers and scholars as the death of God had on theologians and members of religious orders. In the end, some of us may cling mindlessly to the old church; others may abandon labour law entirely; still others may embrace new economic faiths, new political values, new scientific revelations or new legal rituals. Will reflexive labour law rise to the challenge of this new era to provide us with a narrative of workplace normativity which is not only helpful in a descriptive and explanatory sense, but which provides a basis for evaluation and critique? And will those of us who persevere with scholarship in the field be able to build again -with new insights, in new historical circumstances -a new regime of state labour law which speaks social justice to corporate power? Or does the very formulation of these questions mark me as someone who has failed to grasp the fundamental insights of reflexive labour law?
Wilthagen note 3 at 21 ff.
